Thursday, February 24, 2005

Generations vs. Generation

The concept of 4th Generation Warfare has been getting a lot of press and discussion of late. Originally presented in an article in the Marine Corps Gazette in October 1989 by William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), the authors postulated that asymmetric strategies constituted a 4th Generation of of modern warfare. (To paraphrase: The First Generation was mass armies, the Second Generation was attition warfare, and the Third Generation was so-called manuever warfare.) Colonel Thomas X. Hammes has recently updated the concept with the publication of his book The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. (You can also read his thoughts on the matter here.)
While I don't have a lot to argue with the concepts that make up portions of 4GW, I am skeptical of the 1GW, 2GW, 3GW, 4GW typology. Guerrilla warfare and other asymmetric strategies have been with us for a long, long time. See Asprey. In any event, I think that Dr. (and also retired Army Lieutenant Colonel) Antulio Echevarria has an excellent opinion piece up at the Army's Strategic Studies Institute site where he outlines his objections with the 4GW concept. Read it.
Quasi-NS Also, I highly recommend Colin S. Gray's latest article “How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?” in Parameters.

Saturday, February 05, 2005

Strategic Sense and Sensibility

Today’s Washington Post reports, “A preliminary study contracted by the Pentagon has concluded that the Defense Department should not take charge of the CIA's paramilitary functions, senior defense officials said yesterday.” The key paragraph in the story is this:

"If you take the very small paramilitary capabilities away from the CIA, in my view, it would limit their ability to conduct foreign intelligence activities which they are required by law to do," said one senior defense official familiar with the study. Moreover, "we don't have the legal authorities to be doing what the CIA does, so getting all those assets doesn't make any sense," he said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the issue is still unsettled.

This is the correct decision in my mind. There are important distinctions between conducting clandestine and covert operations, and a paramilitary capability is able to do things that a military unit cannot. For instance, a paramilitary organization is less encumbered by, say, which side of an international border it is operating on. Paramilitary units, however, are also not protected under Geneva Convention protections, although in the current GWOT, I think that issue can be oversold; to wit, it doesn't seem like Al Qaeda groups would afford our soldiers such protections in the first place.
Background and Definitions
In contemporary military history the distinctions between paramilitary and military units largely emerged in the Second World War. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) conducted many clandestine and covert activities against the Axis powers. The Jedburgh teams of the OSS, which were used to train, organize, and equip partisans, were actually the predecessor to the U.S. Army Special Forces. As the terrorist threat began to emerge in the 1970s, the United States created the so-called special missions units (SMU) to conduct highly classified activities, generally, although not exclusively, of a counterterrorism nature. A former member of an Army SMU, Command Sergeant Major (ret.) Eric Haney, in his book Inside Delta Force, argues that members of such units are called "operators" because of the seam that they inhabit between being special operations military personnel and intelligence agents.

special operations (SO). [JP 1-02] (DoD) Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

clandestine operation. [JP 1-02] (DoD) An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. See also covert operation; overt operation.

covert operation. S. [JP 1-02] (DoD) An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. See also clandestine operation; overt operation.

Wednesday, February 02, 2005

The Wait Out

Anthony's post about the timetable for withdrawal from Iraq reminded me of a certain episode of Seinfeld.

ELAINE: Hey, my God, look at that. (Jerry looks over at the table. A man and a woman are dining) David and Beth Lookner. (Leaning in for confidentiality) You know, I heard a rumor their marriage was a little rocky.
JERRY: (Interested, still looking at the couple) Really?
ELAINE: Mm-hmm.
JERRY: You know, I have a little thing for Beth Lookner.
ELAINE: Well, I have to admit, I've always thought David was kind of sponge-worthy. (Winks, making a clicking sound with her tongue)
JERRY: Yeah.. I've been waitin' out their marriage for three years.
ELAINE: Yeah, me too. Well, I've been waiting out two or three marriages, but this is the one I really had my eye on.

Now, the insurgents in Iraq have shown that they have patience, so, the issue for me is this: If you announce a time-line for withdrawal, doesn't that automatically say to the insurgents, just wait a little bit longer and your time will come? Sure 30,000-50,000 coalition troops would remain under the O'Hanlon-Steinberg option, but that could lead insurgents to consider rolling the dice and thinking that its better to work against 30-50K troops than 200K. Now obviously something will eventually have to give as the current force structure cannot continue to perpetually rotate large numbers of troops into Iraq while also dealing with Afghanistan and other commitments, but I still think some strategic ambiguity should be in place.
The late-Colonel Kevin Cunningham and Dr. Robert Tomes have an excellent article in the fall 2004 issue of Armed Forces & Society* entitled "Space-Time Orientations and Contemporary Political Military Thought." This article does a nice job of discussing perceptions of time and the effects that they play on military decision-making. The authors' argue that the American "monochronic" spatial-temporal orientation -- characterized by: zero-sum process, segmented execution, and agendas mapped to the future -- put us at a disadvantage against "polychronic" orientations -- characterized by an acceptance of non zero-sum outcomes, issues addressed in parallel, circular time perception, and agendas mapped to history. These distinctions, at least to me, make a useful contribution to thinking about how we counter the insurgency in Iraq and also the larger global Salafist insurgency. I hope that Cunningham and Tomes' article is getting a wide reading on both sides of the Potomac.
* That issue also contains an article by a certain Mark R. Lewis entitled "Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus."